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The present study investigated 3-year-old children’s learning processes about object
functions. We built on children’s tendency to commit scale errors with tools to explore
whether they would selectively endorse object functions from a linguistic in-group over
an out-group model. Participants (n = 37) were presented with different object sets,
and a model speaking either in their native or a foreign language demonstrated how
to use the presented tools. In the test phase, children received the object sets with
two modifications: the original tool was replaced by one that was too big to achieve
the goal but was otherwise identical, and another tool was added to the set that
looked different but was appropriately scaled for goal attainment. Children in the Native
language condition were significantly more likely to commit scale errors – that is, choose
the over-sized tool – than children in the Foreign language condition (48 vs. 30%). We
propose that these results provide insight into the characteristics of human-specific
learning processes by showing that children are more likely to generalize object functions
to a category of artifacts following a demonstration from an in-group member.
Keywords: scale error, object function, social category, learning, language
INTRODUCTION
Differentiating between people who belong to our social group from those who do not contributes
greatly to our success in social interactions. The ability to detect the boundaries of social categories
is not only vital in case of intergroup conflict, but it also helps us govern our behavior in everyday
situations, such as determining what language to choose as the form of communication, how to
interpret the behavior of the other person, etc. For adults, the process of categorization seems
effortless and inevitable when faced with social stimuli (e.g., Taylor et al., 1978). Research with pre-
school children have repeatedly shown that category-based thinking, stereotyping and in-group
favoritism appear quite early in development (Aboud and Skerry, 1984).
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In the past decades, ample evidence has been accumulated
to support the notion that the tendency to perceive the social
world as made up of groups emerges in infancy, and that this
capacity may constitute a special faculty of the human mind
(Kinzler and Spelke, 2007). For example, infants already at three
months of age seem to be able to differentiate between female
and male faces (Quinn et al., 2002), and they prefer to look at
faces belonging to their own racial group (Kelly et al., 2005).
Importantly, despite the early emergence of the ability to perceive
the differences between various social categories, results suggest
that some cues of group membership take precedence over others
(Kinzler et al., 2010). A growing body of evidence highlights
the importance of language in the process of categorization and
developing social preferences. For example, Kinzler and Spelke
(2011) have shown that 10-month-old and 2.5-year-old children
do not preferentially interact with a racial in-group person, but
using the same paradigm, a clear preference was observed for a
native speaker over a person speaking a foreign language (Kinzler
et al., 2007). In another study directly comparing the relevance
of race and language in children’s choices of friends, 5-year-
olds were found to select people who were from a different
race, but spoke with their native accent over people of the
same race but speaking with a foreign accent (Kinzler et al.,
2009).
For children, the importance of identifying members of the
same social group lies – at least partly – in the information
it may provide about the knowledgeability of the individual
(Kinzler et al., 2012; Oláh et al., 2014). Language and accent
supposedly prove to be such reliable cues because they usually
mark the boundaries of broader cultural groups; therefore people
speaking the same language likely share other aspects of cultural
knowledge as well. Keeping track of the knowledge state of others
is a key factor behind conducting successful social interactions
with others, yet it has a special significance for infants and
children who are just in the process of acquiring knowledge about
the world. Children will be most successful in this endeavor if
they can select trustworthy and knowledgeable informants, who
will provide information that is valid and useful within the given
social context. Language and accent can be good indicators for
children whether someone is potentially a reliable teacher for
them.
So far, a handful of studies have explored the significance of
linguistic group membership in infants’ and children’s willingness
to accept information from someone. Kinzler et al. (2012) have
shown that 10-month-old infants extend the preference for
native speakers to the objects they interact with. When given
the possibility to choose from two toys previously introduced
by a native and a non-native speaker, infants reliably choose
the one introduced by the native model. Similarly, Shutts et al.
(2009) showed that 12-month-old infants’ choices of food were
influenced by the emotional reactions of linguistic in-groups, but
not that of out-groups.
Moreover, Buttelmann et al. (2013) have shown that 14-
month-old infants were more likely to imitate a sub-optimal
means to achieve a goal following a demonstration by an in-group
member than by an out-group member. However no selectivity
was observed in endorsing the object preferences of different
group members. A study by Howard et al. (2015) further extends
our understanding of social category based learning processes
by showing that 19-month-old children only took into account
the group membership of the model in an imitation task when
the demonstration was administered on screen, but not in the
case of live modeling. Contrarily, 3-year-old children selectively
imitated an in-group member regardless of the mode of the
demonstration, showing that selectivity becomes stronger with
age.
A relevant question concerns children’s learning about object
functions, since humans’ habits in using artifacts have an
inherently cultural aspect. While an artifact may be appropriate
to bring about several different goals, a very specific function is
usually assigned to them during production. Adults and older
children have a strong propensity to define object categories
by the intended function, known as the design-stance (Dennett,
1989). Casler and Kelemen (2005) have shown that the precursors
of this can be found in children as young as 2 years of age.
Children of this age seem to represent objects as existing for
certain purposes and view this purpose as an intrinsic property of
the given object (the teleo-functional stance) – though they cannot
yet explicitly give explanations in terms of the design-stance. It
follows from such a conceptualization of artifact functions that
they are not strictly or exclusively determined by the physical
properties of the object, but that there is a partly arbitrary
or incidental element in the process of assigning functions
to objects. This arbitrary component makes object functions
variable across cultures. Thus, object functions constitute a part
of our cultural knowledge (e.g., whether we use a fork or
chopsticks for eating).
Another important quality of object functions is that they
are generally causally opaque by simple observation (Csibra
and Gergely, 2009), therefore novices must rely on culturally
knowledgeable individuals to pass on information about the
intended function. In this study, we build on the phenomenon of
scale error to investigate whether children can flexibly modulate
their learning processes in response to the cultural group
membership of the person demonstrating the object function.
The term scale error refers to young children’s tendency to
disregard the actual size of the object they are interacting with
when the object category is familiar to them. As a consequence,
for example, they may try to slide down a miniature slide or
try to squeeze themselves into a matchbox sized car (DeLoache
et al., 2004). DeLoache et al. (2004) have demonstrated this
phenomenon in children aged 18–30 months in a free-play setting
and suggest that it may stem from an inability to integrate
information from distinct processes in visual perception and
from a lack of inhibitory control. Specifically, when children
encounter an object that activates the representation of a kind of
object, an action plan is formed based on stored knowledge of
the object category. This action plan, however, does not become
inhibited by size information as it would in the case of adults or
older children. DeLoache et al. (2004) propose that this may be
due to the lack of integration of information processed by the
ventral and dorsal visual stream (Milner and Goodale, 1995) or a
dissociation between action planning and control (Glover, 2004).
Since the study by DeLoache et al. (2004), a number of studies
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have confirmed the robustness of scale errors (e.g., Rosengren
et al., 2009; Ware et al., 2010).
Casler et al. (2011) have demonstrated the same phenomenon
in two-year-old children with instrumental tool-use in a
structured setting. In this study, children were presented with
novel and familiar object sets. In the first phase of the experiment,
a model demonstrated how to use the tools to achieve certain
goals. Afterwards, children received the object sets with one
alteration: the original tool was replaced by one that was
either too big or too small to efficiently bring the goal about.
Additionally, they received a novel object that was appropriate
for goal attainment, but had not been presented during the
demonstration. Under such circumstances, 2-year-old children
committed scale errors 31% of the time. Casler et al. (2011) argue
that a proneness to committing the scale error may originate
from the early emerging teleo-functional stance (Casler and
Kelemen, 2005), that is, to view artifacts as existing to serve
certain functions. As a consequence, the function of the tool is
incorporated into the representation of the object kind and when
the category representation becomes active, it inevitably activates
the representation of the task the object is for.
Although committing scale errors seems to be a robust
phenomenon that has been demonstrated in numerous studies,
the occurrence rate of it seems to vary with age. However, results
from different studies do not show a clear trend of decreasing
or increasing occurrence rates with age. DeLoache et al. (2004)
have found that among 18–30 month-old participants, the 20.5–
24 month-old group was the most prone to scale errors (with
making 1.3 scale errors on 3 object sets on average). On the
other hand, Ware et al. (2006) found that when testing children
between the ages of 16–24, 29–32, and 35–40 months, the latter
group committed the most scale errors.
In this study, we build on the assumption that scale errors
occur with tools due to the fact that function constitutes an
inherent part of stored knowledge about object categories.
We propose that this makes the phenomenon of scale error
sensitive to the context of knowledge acquisition. Research
suggest that learning about object kinds happens with the help
of specialized learning mechanisms that allow the observer
to efficiently gain information about a category of objects
from a single demonstration (e.g., Futó et al., 2010; Butler
and Markman, 2012; for a general description see the
Natural Pedagogy Theory, Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009;
Gergely and Csibra, 2006). Cues, such as eye-contact, specific
intonation, and addressing prompt the learner to extract
generalizable knowledge from the demonstration (as opposed to
episodic information), thus contributing to the generation and
enrichment of knowledge stored about object kinds. However,
as described in the beginning of this review, efficient learning
also requires an ability to select knowledgeable teachers, who
can provide valid information. Therefore, we hypothesized
that if tool functions were presented by in-group models,
children would be more prone to subsequently committing
scale errors since the demonstrated function would be more
likely to be incorporated into the representation of the object.
We followed the methods of Casler et al. (2011) with the
modification that the demonstrator was either presented as a
speaker of children’s native language or a foreign language.
We involved 3-year-old children in the study, as this is the
age where both the occurrence of scale errors (e.g., Ware
et al., 2006) and selectivity based on the linguistic group
membership of the model (Howard et al., 2015) have been
robustly demonstrated.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study was carried out with the approval of the Research
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Education and Psychology
of Eötvös Loránd University. Participants’ caregivers gave written
informed consent.
Participants
Participants were 37 monolingual Hungarian children (14 girls)
recruited through advertisements in the local area. Their ages
ranged from 30 to 40 months, with a mean of 33.31 months
(SD = 2.69). Children were randomly assigned to either the
Native (n = 17) or the Foreign (n = 20) language condition.
An additional 9 children were tested but later excluded from the
sample due to passivity (3), camera failure (3), experimenter error
(2), and the child was bilingual (1).
Materials
The object sets used in the study were inspired by three of the
object sets used in the study of Casler et al. (2011). Each set
consisted of a target object and three potential tools. There was
one tool used in the demonstration phase and two presented in
the test phase. One tool used in the test phase was identical to
the one introduced during demonstration except that it was too
big to bring about the goal, whereas the other testing tool was an
alternate to the originally presented one with different perceptual
features but corresponding size and affordances. The first object
set could be used to paint on paper and consisted of a container
with blue paint mixed with water inside (11 × 10.5 × 5 cm), a
small paintbrush (19 cm long with a 3.5 × 1.5 cm head), a larger
paintbrush that could not fit into the container (24 cm long with
a 4.5 × 1.5 cm head) and a silicone brush (19 cm long with a
2.5 × 1.3 cm head). The second object set consisted of a yellow
box (25.6 × 12.5 × 9.5) with a hole (1.5 × 1.2 cm) on top and
a plastic toy inside that made a whistling noise when pushed on.
The small tool used in the demonstration was a yellow wooden
flat stick (14.9 cm long, 1.4 cm wide), while its larger counterpart
was 29.7 × 3.9 cm in size. The alternate tool was a cylindrical
stick painted red (14.8 cm, 9 mm diameter). The target action
entailed inserting the tool in the hole to push on the toy inside
the box and to elicit the sound. The last object set constituted of
a blue box (10 × 10 × 10 cm) with a transparent tube (1.9 cm
diameter) attached on top and a small ball inside the tube. The
originally presented small tool was a thin wooden stick (14.5 cm
long) with wooden balls (1.8 cm diameter) attached on both ends.
Its larger counterpart was 25 cm long, while the balls attached
were 3.5 cm in diameter. The alternate tool was a stick made out
of cork (13 cm long, diameter: 1.5 cm). The target action entailed
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pushing the ball out of the tube with the help of the tool. For the
object sets (see Figure 1).1
Procedure
Experiments were conducted by 4 female experimenters of whom
2 took turns in taking the role of Experimenter 1 (E1) and 2
took turns in taking the role of Experimenter 2 (E2); however,
the roles were counterbalanced across conditions, thus each
experimenter participated in both the Foreign and the Native
language conditions. E1 was the person greeting the participants
and administering the test trials, while E2 played the role of the
demonstrator. E1 always spoke in the child’s native language,
whereas the language E2 used depended on condition.
Upon arrival to the laboratory, children were received by E1,
who invited the child to participate in a session of free play
in order to familiarize children with the environment and the
experimenter. When the child seemed comfortable in the setting,
E1 escorted the child and the caregiver into the testing room,
where children were seated on the caregiver’s lap in front of a
small table. E1 then told the child that she would be back in a
few seconds and left. At this point, a second female experimenter
(E2) entered the room and sat down at the opposite end of the
table. She started the demonstration by saying three sentences
either in Hungarian (participants’ native language) or in German
(a foreign language to the participants). The sentences were
construed in a way that they did not help the interpretation
of the object function demonstration, but were not completely
unrelated to the context in order to avoid confusing children
in the Native condition. The sentences could be translated into
English as follows: “Where have I put my things? They must
be here somewhere. Ah, there they are!”. After that, she pulled
out the first object set containing the target object and the small
tool. She took the tool in her hand, looked at the child with
1The object sets could be categorized as either completely novel to children (the
yellow box with the toy inside and the blue box with the tube on top) or familiar
(painting).
FIGURE 1 | Materials. The picture depicts the target objects with the original
tool and the corresponding over-sized and alternate tools presented in the
test phase. The original tool was named by a non-word (see top row) in the
beginning of each demonstration.
a smile, named the tool by a non-word and demonstrated the
action. Then, she put away the object set and performed the
demonstration with the other two object sets one after the other.
When the demonstration was over, E2 left the room and E1
re-entered. E1 sat down and said to the child: “Now let’s play
something, shall we? Let me just see what we have here!” She
then pulled out the first object set from behind a panel with two
alterations compared to the initial demonstration. The tool used
in the first phase was replaced by its larger counterpart that was
inappropriately scaled to bring about the same goal. The alternate
tool was also presented this time. The two tools were placed
on the two sides of the target object. Children were allowed to
interact with the object set for as long as they showed interest.
After that, E1 put away the object set and presented the next
one with the same alterations. All children received 3 trials, one
with each object set. Children received the object sets in two pre-
defined orders. The order and the side of the tools in the test phase
were counterbalanced across conditions.
Coding
We analyzed children’s choices of tools in the first 1.5 min of
the interaction phase with each object set. Only children’s first
choices were taken into account and we coded whether it was
the over-sized (committing the scale error) or the alternate tool
(not committing the scale error). Children not choosing a tool
during this time were considered passive on the trial (object set)
and the trial was excluded from analyses (Native: 2 out of 51 trials;
Foreign: 6 out of 60 trials). An independent coder blind to the
research question coded 80% of the videos. Reliability between
the coders was good (Cohen’s kappa: 0.86).
To test whether children were equally attentive in the Foreign
condition as in the Native condition, children’s looking behavior
during the demonstration phase was also coded using Solomon
Coder (András Péter).2 We coded the time children spent looking
at each action demonstration from the moment E2 named the
object she was about to use until the moment she started putting
away the object set in question. We found that children in both
conditions were attentive for almost the whole duration of the
demonstrations (98.6% in the Foreign condition and 99.29% in
the Native condition). The difference between conditions was not
significant (t(30)= 0.72; p= 0.48).
RESULTS
Statistical analyses were performed with the SPSS 20 software.
We used Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) with binary
regression to test for differences in the occurrence of scale errors
across conditions. We used this method for analyses since the
dependent variable is not continuous, but is composed of three
nominal values (a choice between the oversized tool and the novel
tool on three trials). Therefore a GLMM is the best option as it
can treat the different trials separately and thus provides a more
elaborate test of the question. We used backwards modeling,
where the following variables were included in the initial model,
2http://solomoncoder.com
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 963
fpsyg-07-00963 June 22, 2016 Time: 13:26 # 5
Oláh et al. Children’s Selective Generalization of Functions
but were later removed as they were not significant: sex and age of
the child, the presentation order of the object sets, side of the tools
used in the test, the identities of the two experimenters, object
type (novel/familiar). “Participant” was added to the model as a
factor and “trial” as the repeated measure. In addition to these
effects, only condition as a fixed effect was included in the final
model.
Condition had a significant main effect on the amount of
scale errors committed by children, with more scale errors
occurring in the Native as opposed to the Foreign condition (F (1,
101) = 4.024; p = 0.048). On average, participants in the Native
language condition committed the scale error on 48% of the
trials, whereas the rate was 30% in the Foreign language condition
(Figure 2).
The same effect of condition held with a simple comparison
of proportions (occurrence rate of scale errors in the two
conditions) using a χ2 test (χ2(1)= 6.81; p= 0.009).
DISCUSSION
Building on the phenomenon of scale error, the present study
investigated whether 3-year-old children’s learning processes
about tool functions would be influenced by the group
membership of the person introducing the objects to them.
We found that children were less prone to committing scale
errors if the demonstration was performed by a person speaking
in a foreign language. We propose that this result does not
merely inform us about a quite specific phenomenon described
in the developmental literature –that is, the occurrence of scale
errors – but it reflects the special characteristics of human-
specific learning mechanisms. As described in the introduction,
scale errors supposedly occur because children do not treat
the artifacts they encounter as individual and unique objects,
but form representations of object kinds, during which the
function assigned to the category of the artifact becomes a core
characteristic (Casler et al., 2011). It has been suggested that a
FIGURE 2 | Avarage ratio of scale errors committed in the Native and
the Foreign language conditions on the three trials. The asterisk
indicates that the difference is significant at the level of 0.05.
specialized learning mechanism helps children to extract kind-
relevant, generalizable information from a single demonstration
if the interactional partner expresses their intention of passing
on knowledge (Csibra and Gergely, 2009). In this study, children
supposedly committed the scale error on nearly half of the
trials in the Native condition because they regarded the initial
demonstration as an instance of teaching. Thus, the above-
described genericity-bias (Csibra and Gergely, 2009) led them to
retrieve the acquired knowledge (the function of the tool) in the
presence of another exemplar of the same category (the over-
sized counterpart of the original object) and children tried to
enforce that function on the given exemplar irrespective of its
actual size. It has also been shown that children are more prone
to committing scale errors when the objects are named during
the demonstration (Hunley and Hahn, 2016). This labeling effect
with scale errors originates from the phenomenon that learning
of object kinds is facilitated by naming the object (e.g., Booth
and Waxman, 2002). In our study, this enhanced the proneness
to committing scale errors in the Native condition, but children
were not equally willing to accept the information from the model
speaking a foreign language.
We thus propose that the decreased occurrence rate of scale
errors in the Foreign language condition can be accounted for
by the selectivity children exhibit in learning situations. That
is, even though children may perceive the teaching intention
exhibited by the model, a specific mistrust toward the epistemic
state of the model leads them to refuse to endorse the information
presented. Results suggest that even though pedagogical cues
facilitate learning in general, young children are not equally
willing to accept information from all sources. For example,
14-month-old infants are reluctant to imitate a model whose
past behavior has turned out to be misleading (Poulin-Dubois
et al., 2011) or could be seen as incompetent based on the level
of confidence they exhibited (Zmyj et al., 2010). Importantly,
studies have also shown that children show selectivity based on
the language the potential teacher speaks (e.g., Buttelmann et al.,
2013; Howard et al., 2015). Language cues can be of special
importance when acquiring culturally relevant knowledge (such
as tool functions) since the use of a foreign language is an
indication that the person is not familiar with the ways of the
given culture. Consequently children may not view them as a
reliable source of information. We propose that the drop in the
occurrence of scale errors reflect children’s resistance to accept
the foreign language speaking model as a teacher and therefore
they did not extract kind-based knowledge about the objects,
which subsequently led to less confusion in the test phase.
Alternatively, the decreased occurrence of scale errors in the
Foreign condition may not reflect a mistrust in the model, but
a failure to encode the teaching intentions of a foreign speaker.
This could possibly be the result of an intuition that members
of different cultural groups keep to different norms in their
behavior; therefore children could exhibit more confusion when
interpreting the signals of an out-group member. While this
interpretation is not perfectly independent of the one outlined
in the previous section, nor are the two necessarily mutually
exclusive, the sensitivity to communicative cues may constitute
such a fundamental and universal capacity of the human mind
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(Csibra and Gergely, 2011), that it is unlikely to be disrupted in
such a case.
An alternative explanation for our result could be that children
simply paid less attention to the foreign language model and that
is why scale errors occurred with less frequency. However, this
explanation is not likely, as children were equally attentive during
the demonstration regardless of condition and they seemed
to understand the basic structures of the different tasks (they
attempted to achieve the goal that was demonstrated). If children
had been simply inattentive in the Foreign condition, then we
would have expected to see instances where children were simply
lost at how to interact with the novel objects. However, this was
not the case; children reached for one of the tools on almost all
trials in both conditions (see the section on Coding).
Altogether, our participants committed more scale errors than
children in the study of Casler et al. (2011). While the ratio
of scale errors in their study is comparable to that found in
the Foreign language condition (around 30%), this number was
substantially higher in the Native language condition (48%). This
may be accounted for by the fact that we did not use the exact
same object sets as did Casler et al. (2011). Instead of using four
object sets, we settled on replicas of three of the ones used in
their study. Importantly, Casler et al. (2011) have found that
children committed the most scale errors when presented with
novel apparatuses and novel tools (40%). In our study, two out
of three object sets can be regarded as novel tool-novel apparatus
sets, which could have resulted in higher overall ratios.
On the one hand, our study contributes to our understanding
of how the group membership of the model influences children’s
learning processes. On the other, it provides a further piece of
evidence to support the claim that scale errors cannot solely be
explained in terms of problems of inhibitory control, but that
they result from the way children form representations of tools
and their functions (Casler et al., 2011). Specifically, children view
artifacts as being for certain functions and they treat this artifact-
function correspondence in quite a rigid way. Furthermore, our
study suggests that scale errors are at least partly the result of the
characteristics of human-specific learning processes that result in
viewing an object as having a fixed function.
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